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ABSTRACT
"George Bush doesn't care about [BIlack people,"1 exclaimed musician
Kanye West during a fundraiser for Hurricane Katrina on NBC. Kanye
West was expressing his frustration with the federal government's re-
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1. Lisa De Morales, Kanye West's Torrent of Criticism, Live on NBC, WASH. POST,
Sept. 3, 2005, at C1 (seeking to raise money for the American Red Cross, Kanye West and
a host of other celebrities performed live on national TV).
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sponse to Hurricane Katrina, which he characterized as race-related.2
Like West, Whites and Blacks, albeit disproportionately, believe race was
a factor in the federal government's "inadequate" response to Hurricane
Katrina.3 Indeed, a race-related governmental response to Hurricane
Katrina could have constitutional implications. While the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects against discrimina-
tion,4 it distinguishes between permissible and impermissible
discrimination. This Note explores the constitutional implications of the
federal government's response to Hurricane Katrina, if any, and whether
or not the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause
provided the residents of New Orleans "the equal protection of the
laws." 5
Since the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was cre-
ated to respond to natural disasters, this Note focuses on FEMA's re-
sponse to Hurricane Katrina and whether FEMA's response violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In all likeli-
hood, when FEMA responded to Hurricane Katrina, the response com-
ported with the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, the government's slow
and inadequate response to "one of the worst natural disasters in United
States history" and its uneven distribution of resources to residents in
New Orleans created a disparate impact between Blacks and Whites.6 In
light of the government's slow and inadequate response to Hurricane Ka-
trina, the disparate impact caused by the response, and the purpose of the
Equal Protection Clause, perhaps the Supreme Court should re-evaluate
its interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause.7 While "the intent re-
2. Id. (making a remark about George Bush, Kanye rationalized the government's
slow and inadequate response to New Orleans by saying, "And, you know, it's been five
days [waiting for federal help] because most of the people are [Bllack.").
3. Reaction to Katrina Split on Racial Lines, CNN.coM, Sept. 13, 2005, http://www.cnn.
com/2005/US/09/12/katrina.race.poll/index.html (citing to a CNN/ USA Today/ Gallup poll
in which six out of ten Blacks believed the government was slow because many of the
residents of Louisiana were Black). However, when comparing Whites, one out of eight
believed the government was slow "because" many of the residents of Louisiana were
Black. Id.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
5. Id. ("[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.").
6. William C. Rhoden, Pity the Poorest While America Waves the Flag, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 10, 2005, available at http:l/www.nytimes.coml2005/09/10/sportsltennisllOrhoden.
html.
7. This Note seeks to answer various questions: When it responded to Hurricane Ka-
trina, did the federal government violate the equal protection guarantees of the Constitu-
tion? How would a victim of Hurricane Katrina establish a violation of these guarantees?
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quirement" of the Equal Protection Clause may uphold the constitution-
ality of social service programs, it may fail to "provide equal protection of
the laws." 8 This Note uses the federal government's response to Hurri-
cane Katrina to explore the shortcomings of the intent requirement and
whether the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Equal Protection
Clause provides "equal protection of the laws."
The first section of this Note focuses on the city and residents of New
Orleans. It describes the conditions of the levees, the intensity of the
storm, and some of the pre-existing, pre-Katrina disparities between
Blacks and Whites in New Orleans. As this Note argues, FEMA exacer-
bated these pre-existing disparities when it responded to Hurricane
Katrina.
The second section discusses FEMA's role in natural disasters, its re-
organization under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and its
response to Hurricane Katrina. President George W. Bush, Congress,
and the public have characterized FEMA's response as "inadequate."9
Some of this criticism is grounded in FEMA's re-organization under DHS
and the selection of inexperienced individuals to head the agency. How-
ever, this Note focuses on FEMA's response itself and how it impacted
Blacks and Whites differently.
After discussing FEMA's response and its racially disparate impact, the
Note explores the relationship between this response and the Constitu-
tion. Specifically, it investigates whether FEMA's response violated the
Equal Protection Clause. However, before discussing FEMA's potential
violation of the Equal Protection Clause, the third section traces the his-
tory of the Clause and the Supreme Court's interpretation of it. As will
Did the Framers intend for the Fourteenth Amendment to protect against systematic (or
institutional) racism? Did the federal government fail to provide equal protection of the
laws? Does the Supreme Court's interpretation of the equal protection guarantees in fact
guarantee equal protection of the laws? Does the Supreme Court interpretations of these
guarantees advance the purposes of the Clause?
8. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (finding that the intent requirement of the
Equal Protection Clause, in and of itself, may not be able to provide equal protection of
the laws).
9. Bush Admits Katrina Response Was Inadequate, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Sept. 16,
2005, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/09/16/europe/web.0915katl.php; see U.S.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE: FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT
BIPARTISAN COMMIT-EE TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE TO
HURRICANE KATRINA (2006), http://www.gpoaccess.gov/katrinareport/mainreport.pdf. In
this report, Congress uses the word "inadequate" to describe the following: response; over-
sight of the use of federal funds; readiness of FEMA's response teams; delivery of relief
supplies; communication, relocation housing plans, and logistics capacity; preparations for
a large population at the Superdome; the shelter of last resort (Superdome and Convention
Center); number of qualified personnel; amounts of food and water (at the Superdome and
Convention Center; and housing plans. Id.
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be discussed, scholars have criticized "the intent requirement" the Su-
preme Court has read into the Equal Protection Clause.1 0
The fourth section analyzes FEMA's response to Katrina under the in-
tent requirement established in the Supreme Court decisions of Davis"
and Feeney."2 Even though a survivor could likely establish a disparate
impact between Blacks and Whites, the intent requirement would likely
preclude the establishment of a constitutional violation. In light of the
heavy burden the intent requirement imposes, the fifth section advances
the arguments for and against the intent requirement and discusses the
potential solutions to its shortcomings. As the fifth and sixth sections
argue, the Court should re-evaluate its interpretation of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause and find a way to reduce the harms of racial inequality and
the burden imposed on the plaintiff by the intent requirement. A negli-
gence standard would better provide "equal protection of the laws."
I. THE CITY AND RESIDENTS OF NEW ORLEANS
From the beginning, the city of New Orleans was doomed. 3 Due to its
location below sea level, the city was vulnerable to natural disasters. 4
The Army Corps of Engineers constructed levees to reduce the vulnera-
bility of the city. However, the levees were structurally unsound and in-
capable of protecting the city against high-strength hurricanes.1 5 As
engineers and scientists predicted,1 6 "Katrina's surge was higher than the
system was designed to handle."'" While Katrina and its 127 mph winds
10. Washington, 426 U.S. at 248; Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,
279 (1979) (noting that an adverse impact alone is not enough).
11. Washington, 426 U.S. at 229.
12. Personnel Adm'r of Mass., 442 U.S. at 256.
13. Evan Thomas, The Lost City, What Went Wrong: Devastating a Swath of the South,
Katrina Plunged New Orleans into Agony. The Story of a Storm and a Disastrously Slow
Rescue, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 12, 2005, available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/104563
("Built mostly below sea-level on a spongy sliver of land between a massive lake and a
mighty river, New Orleans has always been one big storm away from disaster.").
14. Id. (finding the construction of New Orleans to be under sea level).
15. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, https://ipet.wes.army.mil/ (last visited Jan. 25,
2009) (describing the responsibility of the Army Corps of Engineers over New Orleans
levee construction).
16. John Swartz, Army Builders Accept Blame Over Flooding, N.Y. TIMES, June 6,
2006 (discussing how the levees were "flawed in design" and "not built to handle [a] storm
anywhere near [the] strength of Hurricane Katrina.").
17. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, https://ipet.wes.army.mil/ (last visited Jan. 25,
2009) (describing the level of surge the levee's were designed to handle). "The HPS was
designed to protect against severe storm conditions the region typically experiences. But
Hurricane Katrina's surge and waves significantly exceeded those of the typical severe
storm striking the Gulf Coast." Id. at 11.
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ravaged the city, the levees faltered 18 and flooded eighty percent of the
city.1 9 The city could not withstand a high-strength hurricane like
Katrina.2°
Hurricane Katrina was one of the costliest and deadliest hurricanes in
the history of the United States.21 Katrina's winds reached speeds of 130
mph, its storm surge twenty-seven feet, and its wrath 93,000 square
miles.2 2 But the intensity of the storm is better understood through the
damage it caused. It destroyed 300,000 homes, caused $96 billion in prop-
erty damage, and resulted in 1300 deaths.2 3 Due to the water damage,
significant portions of the thirty-fifth largest city in the United States are
still uninhabitable. 24 Fortunately, the Stafford Act provides assistance to
victims of disasters.2 5 Under the Stafford Act, FEMA is authorized to
provide financial assistance and other needs assistance to disasters rising
to the level of a state of emergency, as determined by the President of the
18. See Willie Dry, New Orleans Flooded in Wake of Hurricane Katrina, NAT'L GEO-
GRAPHICAL NEWS, Aug. 31, 2005, available at http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/
2005/08/0831_050831_katrina-flooding. See U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, A FAIL-
URE OF INITIATIVE: FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT BIPARTISAN COMMITTEE TO INVESTI-
GATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA 86 (2006), http://
www.gpoaccess.gov/katrinareport/mainreport.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2007). Kathleen
Babineaux Blanco, the Governor of Louisiana said, "What happened to us this year, how-
ever, can only be described as a catastrophe of Biblical proportions. We in Louisiana know
hurricanes and hurricanes know us. We would not be here today if the levees had not
failed." Id.
19. John Swartz, The Nation: Too Bad Hippocrates Wasn't an Engineer, N.Y. TIMES,
June 6, 2006, § 4 (remarking how a report from the Army Corps of Engineers "concluded
that flaws in the design, building, and maintenance of the New Orleans hurricane protec-
tion system ... played a big role in putting 80% of the city underwater.").
20. See R.B. SEED ET AL., PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE PERFORMANCE OF THE NEW
ORLEANS LEVEE SYSTEMS IN HURRICANE KATRINA ON AUGUST 29, 2005, at 8-1 to 8-3
(2005) (summarizing the findings of the failed levees and floodwalls due to the storm
surges generated by Hurricane Katrina). Katrina was a category five hurricane on August
28, 2005, but it "weakened" to a category four before it hit New Orleans on August 29,
2005. Id. at 1-2.
21. U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE: FINAL REPORT OF
THE SELECT BIPARTISAN COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RE-
SPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA 7 (2006), http://www.gpoaccess.gov/katrinareport/main
report.pdf.
22. Frances Townsend, THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS
LEARNED 1 (2006), http://www.whitehouse.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned/.pdf
(describing the force and velocity of Katrina's hurricane winds).
23. Id. at 7 (assessing the damages caused by Katrina).
24. June Sawyers, New Orleans, Greatest Trips, Washington, D.C., CHI. TRIB., Feb. 18,
2007, available at http://.chicagotribune.com/chi-O70215resourcefulfebl8-story,0484346.
story?coll=chi-900siteindex-fea.
25. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93-
288, 88 Stat. 143 (1974) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5207 (2000)).
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United States.26 FEMA has provided four billion dollars to survivors of
Katrina for financial and housing assistance, more than any other single
natural disaster.27 In addition to financial and housing expenses, FEMA
has issued approximately 240,000 checks to Louisiana residents for "other
needs assistance. "28 This type of assistance includes medical, dental, and
funeral expenses.29 Unfortunately, Katrina caused 1300 deaths, and
eighty percent of the deaths occurred in the New Orleans metropolitan
area.30 Katrina and the subsequent flooding of New Orleans directly
caused a majority of these deaths; however, they indirectly caused others.
For example, the toxic water in New Orleans is responsible for five deaths
and the conditions at Superdome and New Orleans Convention Center
are responsible for others.3 ' The residents who were stranded in New
Orleans waded through the toxic waters to reach the Superdome and
New Orleans Convention Center. Lawlessness and disorder were ram-
pant at the places to which the government directed the stranded re-
sidents of New Orleans.32  The residents who endured these
circumstances were disproportionately poor and Black.33
One year after Katrina subsided, the Kaiser Family Foundation con-
ducted a study and discovered post-Katrina disparities between Black
26. 42 U.S.C. § 5174 (2000) (describing the type of federal assistance individuals and
households may receive as result of major disasters).
27. News Release, FEMA, By the Numbers: FEMA Recovery Update in Louisiana
(Jan. 17, 2006), available at http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=2251. This
number is expected to grow to $7.7 billion. Id.
28. Id. § 5174(e)(2) ("The President, in consultation with the Governor of a State,
may provide financial assistance under this section to an individual or household described
in paragraph (1) to address personal property, transportation, and other necessary ex-
penses or serious needs resulting from the major disaster.").
29. Id. § 5174(e)(1) ("The President, in consultation with the Governor of a State,
may provide financial assistance under this section to an individual or household in the
State who is adversely affected by a major disaster to meet disaster-related medical, dental,
and funeral expenses.").
30. U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE: FINAL REPORT OF
THE SELECT BIPARTISAN COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RE-
SPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA 74 (2006), http://www.gpoaccess.gov/katrinareport/main
report.pdf (providing statistical numbers regarding death counts from Katrina).
31. Id. (describing the abhorrent conditions existing post-Katrina); see Craig Dolch,
Back to the Bayou, PALM BEACH POST, Sept. 24, 2006, at 8b (detailing the causes of death
due to toxins).
32. U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE: FINAL REPORT OF
THE SELECT BIPARTISAN COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RE-
SPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA 9 (2006), http://www.gpoaccess.gov/katrinareport/main
report.pdf.
33. See infra Section I & IV.
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and White residents of New Orleans. 34 The storm seemed to have dis-
rupted the lives of twice as many Blacks as Whites.35 To be sure, the pre-
Katrina disparities in New Orleans have something to do with the post-
Katrina disparities. This Note explores the extent to which the former
influenced the latter.
New Orleans is a Black city and a poor city.36 Prior to the hurricane,
New Orleans was sixty-eight percent Black37 and the poverty rate was
twenty-eight percent,38 which was approximately sixteen percentage
points higher than the national average.39 Compared to other counties in
the country, the poverty rate in New Orleans was ranked seventh out of
two hundred and ninety.4" In addition to being a Black and poor city, it
was also a "car-less" city. New Orleans was ranked fourth out of two
hundred ninety seven cities in terms of households lacking access to auto-
mobiles.41 Consistent with the national trend, in New Orleans, the per-
centage of Blacks lacking access to automobiles was greater than any
other racial group at twenty-seven percent.42 The percentage of Whites
lacking access to automobiles was five. 43 As discussed in Section IV,
these statistics are significant because FEMA developed an evacuation
plan based on access to automobiles. Such a plan would seem to have
burdened Blacks more than Whites and would explain why a dispropor-
34. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., THE KAISER POsT-KATRINA BASELINE SURVEY 3
(2007), http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/upload/7631ES.pdf (finding that Blacks were subject
to a greater lively disruption when compared to Whites post-Katrina).
35. Peter Whoriskey, Katrina Hit Blacks Harder than Whites, Study Finds, WASH.
POST, May 10, 2007, at A02 (noting the extreme racial disparity of those who suffered some
sort of disruption post-Katrina).
36. See Adolph L. Reed, The Real Divide, in AFTER THE STORM: BLACK INTELLEcTU-
ALS EXPLORE THE MEANING OF HURRICANE KATRINA 63-64 (David Dante Troutt ed.,
2006) ("New Orleans is a predominately [Bilack city, and it is a largely poor city. The
[B]lack population is disproportionately poor, and the poor population is disproportion-
ately [Bilack.").
37. JESSE MCKINNON, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE BLACK POPULATION: 2000, CEN-
SUS 2000 BRIEF 7 tbl.3 (2001), http://www.census.gov/prod/200lpubs/c2kbrOl-5.pdf.
38. ALEMAYEHU BISHAW & JOHN ICELAND, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POVERTY: 1999,
CENSUS 2000 BRIEF 7 tbl.4 (2003), http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/c2kbr-19.pdf.
39. Id. (according to the Census 2000, 12.4% of the population was below the poverty
level).
40. ALLAN BERUBE & BRUCE KATZ, BROOKINGS INST., KATRINA'S WINDOW: CON-
FRONTING CONCENTRATED POVERTY ACROSS AMERICA 2 (2005) available at http://www.
brookings.edu/metro/20050915_katrinacarstables.pdf.
41. Id. ("Out of 297 metropolitan areas in the U.S., New Orleans ranked fourth in the
proportion of its households without car access .... ).
42. Id. ("[Twenty-seven] percent of African-Americans in the New Orleans area
lacked access to a car ....").
43. Id. ("In the New Orleans metro area as in the rest of the nation, about [five]
percent of non-Hispanic whites lacked auto access.").
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tionate amount of Blacks were stranded in New Orleans. Since many
poor Blacks lacked automobiles and money, they were unable to evacu-
ate the city without the assistance of the government. In lieu of being
evacuated from New Orleans, they were directed to unsafe and unsani-
tary environments such as the Superdome and the New Orleans Conven-
tion Center.44 At the Superdome, the survivors of Katrina waited for
FEMA in the midst of trash, fecal matter, and dead bodies.4 5 They lived
"where people aren't supposed to live."'46 A glimpse at the surroundings
should have reminded these survivors of the inequalities between Blacks
and Whites in America.4 7 One Hurricane Katrina survivor said, "We saw
buses, helicopters, and FEMA trucks, but no one stopped to help us. We
never felt so cut off in all our lives.",48 The government seemed to look
the other way even though it plays a significant role in responding to
natural disasters.4 9 The next section of the Note discusses this role.
II. FEMA AND FEMA's RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA
FEMA responsibility to respond to natural disasters."0 In 1979, Presi-
dent Jimmy Carter created FEMA to provide relief in the wake of natu-
ral disasters.5 " In 2003, FEMA was deprived of its independence when it
44. MICHAEL ERIC DYSON, COME HELL OR HIGH WATER: HURRICANE KATRINA
AND THE COLOR OF DISASTER 64, 68, 71 (2006) (providing information on conditions of
the Superdome and excerpts from Dyson's account of toxic waters).
45. Relief Workers Confront "Urban Workforce," CNN.coM, Sept. 1, 2005, http://
www.cnn.com/2005/WEATHER/09/01/katrina.impact/index.html.
46. U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE: FINAL REPORT OF
THE SELECT BIPARTISAN COMMI'TEE TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RE-
SPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA 7 (2006), http://www.gpoaccess.gov/katrinareport/main
report.pdf.
47. Dayna Bowen Matthew, Disastrous Disasters: Restoring Civil Rights Protections
for Victims of the State in Natural Disasters, 2 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 213, 213 (2006)
(finding that Americans were reminded of the racial and economic divisions within
America).
48. U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE: FINAL REPORT OF
THE SELECT BIPARTISAN COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RE-
SPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA 6 (2006), http://www.gpoaccess.gov/katrinareport/main
report.pdf (quoting a Katrina survivor).
49. Walter Fields, Legacy of Katrina, One Year Later-Untreated Wounds, N. J. REC.,
Aug. 29, 2006, at Ll1 ("Our nation has looked the other way when confronted with pov-
erty, particularity when its face is [B]lack and the locus is urban.").
50. Federal Emergency Management Agency, FEMA History, http://www.fema.gov/
about/history.shtm (last visited Jan. 4, 2009) ("[FEMA] is tasked with responding to, plan-
ning for, recovering from, and mitigating against disasters.").
51. Exec. Order No. 12,148, Fed. 44 Reg. 43,239 (July 20, 1979) (establishing FEMA
as an agency for federal emergency relief).
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was re-organized under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).52
As part of the re-organization, FEMA's objectives were combined with
the objectives of twenty-two other agencies and departments, shifting its
focus from "tornadoes to terror. ' 53 The Bush Administration shifted the
focus of FEMA, the agency created to provide disaster relief, away from
disaster relief.54 Deficiencies resulting from these organizational changes
were apparent when FEMA responded to Hurricane Katrina in a manner
characterized by public figures, the President, and Congress as "inade-
quate. ' 55 Prompted by such criticism, the House of Representatives cre-
ated a bipartisan committee to investigate "the preparation for and
response to Hurricane Katrina. '' 56 In a report entitled A Failure of Initia-
tive, which is referenced throughout this Note, the House of Representa-
tives characterized the government's response as disturbing.57 According
to the report, the selection of inexperienced individuals to head the
agency, coupled with FEMA's re-organization under DHS,58 contributed
to the disturbing response.59 Since the storm has subsided, members of
Congress have introduced eight bills seeking to re-establish FEMA as an
independent agency.6" To be sure, by introducing these bills, Congress
was expressing its dissatisfaction with FEMA's response to Hurricane
Katrina.
Even though the public, the President, and Congress have criticized the
agency's slow and inadequate response to one of the worst natural disas-
ters in U.S. history, other governmental entities are also responsible.61 In
52. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (codified as
amended at 6 U.S.C. § 317 (2000)).
53. MICHAEL ERIC DYSON, COME HELL OR HIGH WATER: HURRICANE KATRINA
AND THE COLOR OF DISASTER 49 (2006).
54. Id. at 52.
55. U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE: FINAL REPORT OF
THE SELECT BIPARTISAN COMMITITEE TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RE-
SPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA (2006), http://www.gpoaccess.gov/katrinareport/main
report.pdf.
56. Id. at ix.
57. Id. at 359.
58. Id. (discussing how emergency management professions have attributed the de-
cline in FEMA's preparedness to its re-organization under DHS).
59. Id.
60. Henry B. Hogue & Keith Bea, Federal Emergency Management and Homeland
Security Organization: Historical Developments and Legislative Options 1 (Cong. Research
Serv., CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL33369, June 1, 2006), available at www.fas.
org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33369.pdf ("As a result of concerns about the effectiveness of the
federal response after Hurricane Katrina, Congress is continuing to rethink the organiza-
tional arrangements for carrying out federal emergency management functions.").
61. PEW RESEARCH CTR., HUGE RACIAL DIVIDE OVER KATRINA AND ITS CONSE-
QUENCES, Two-IN-THREE CRITICAL OF BUSH'S RELIEF EFFORTS 1 (2005), http://people-
press.org/reports/pdf/255.pdf (criticizing the local government's response to Hurricane Ka-
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all fairness, the city of New Orleans made mistakes as well.6 2 For exam-
ple, it refused to evacuate residents with empty city buses and an empty
Amtrak train.63 The empty Amtrak train headed for higher ground with-
out any residents from New Orleans on board. Furthermore, the mayor
of New Orleans, concerned with the legal implications of a mandatory
evacuation order, was hesitant to order one.64 Such a move would have
led to fewer deaths and losses. However, despite these poor decisions,
the medium-sized city of New Orleans was incapable of managing the
large-scale natural disaster without the assistance of the federal govern-
ment.65 Hurricane Katrina required "a national response., 66 Due to
these circumstances, the stranded residents of New Orleans depended on
FEMA to counterbalance the inability of the state and local governments
to respond to large-scale natural disasters. Ultimately, FEMA failed.
President George W. Bush declared a state of emergency in Louisiana
on August 26, 2005, and authorized FEMA to provide relief in the Gulf
Coast.67 This declaration triggered physical and financial assistance
through FEMA.68 Under the Stafford Act, President Bush authorized
trina and its aftermath). Fifty one percent of the public gave "sub-par ratings" to the state
and local governments. Id.; see MICHAEL ERIC DYSON, COME HELL OR HIGH WATER:
HURRICANE KATRINA AND THE COLOR OF DISASTER 62 (2006) (distinguishing between
the mistakes made at the local, state, and national level and describing the federal govern-
ment's "dangerous" delay as on the verge of "criminal").
62. Frances Townsend, THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA LESSONS
LEARNED 1 (2006), http://www.whitehouse.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned.pdf.
63. MICHAEL ERIC DYSON, COME HELL OR HIGH WATER: HURRICANE KATRINA
AND THE COLOR OF DISASTER 57-59 (2006) (noting that the city of New Orleans refused
Amtrak's offer to evacuate people with its trains and failed to use city buses to evacuate
the New Orleans citizens without cars); see Dayna Bowen Matthew, Disastrous Disasters:
Restoring Civil Rights Protections for Victims of the State in Natural Disasters, 2 J. HEALTH
& BIOMEDICAL L. 213, 213 (2006) (stating that "school buses sat idle for lack of drivers,
while the waters rose.").
64. MICHAEL ERIC DYSON, COME HELL OR HIGH WATER: HURRICANE KATRINA
AND THE COLOR OF DISASTER 57-59 (2006); see U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, A
FAILURE OF INITIATIVE: FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT BIPARTISAN COMMITrEE TO IN-
VESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA 2 (2006),
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/katrinareport/mainreport.pdf (stating that despite fifty-six hours
advanced notice, he did not order the mandatory evacuation until nineteen hours before
Katrina hit land).
65. Eric Holdeman, Destroying FEMA, WASH. POST, Aug. 30, 2005, at A17 ("[The
tragedy] requires a national response.").
66. Id.
67. Press Release, FEMA, Statement on Federal Emergency Assistance for Louisiana
(Aug. 27, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/08/20050827-
1.html.
68. 42 U.S.C. § 5122 (2000) ("'Emergency' means any occasion or instance for which,
in the determination of the President, Federal assistance is needed ... to save lives and to
protect property and public health and safety .... ).
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FEMA "to coordinate all disaster relief efforts which have the purpose of
alleviating the hardship and suffering caused by the emergency."6 9 De-
spite the President's declaration, the foreseeable breach of the levees,
and three days warning of the storm, FEMA's director, Michael Brown,
neither heeded the warnings nor requested the dispatch of FEMA em-
ployees70 to New Orleans until five hours after the storm struck. 71 Two
days after the storm struck, FEMA still "had yet to devote [its] full re-
sources to rescuing the Gulf Coast."7 2 Michael Brown may have been
more preoccupied with public relations than disaster relief. In a memo
written by Brown, he asked employees to "convey a positive image of
disaster operations to government officials, community organizations,
and the general public., 7 3 Neither an appreciation for appearances nor
an inadequate response triggers the Constitution per se. However, there
may have been a relationship between the government's response and
race. In the words of Louis Elisa, a former regional director for FEMA
under President Clinton, "I am telling you, as a professional, that you
could not have had a mistake of this nature ... if something else was not
afoot."
74
69. Id.; see Press Release, FEMA, Statement on Federal Emergency Assistance for
Louisiana (Aug. 27, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/08/
20050827-1.html (stating that FEMA was authorized to provide relief services "at its dis-
cretion"). Significantly, the immunity FEMA receives under the Stafford Act applies to
discretionary acts as opposed to constitutional violations. 42 U.S.C. § 5148 (2000) ("The
Federal Government shall not be liable for any claim based upon the exercise or perform-
ance of or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of
a Federal agency .... ").
70. MICHAEL ERIC DYSON, COME HELL OR HIGH WATER: HURRICANE KATRINA
AND THE COLOR OF DISASTER 64 (2006) (finding that Brown requested one thousand DHS
employees to be dispatched within forty-eight hours of the request and two thousand
within seven days); see GOP Leaders Agree to Joint Katrina Hearings, CNN.coM, Sept. 8,
2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005[POLITICS/09/07/katrina.congress/index.html (noting that
the buffer - the forty-eight hours - seems to go against the purposes of FEMA); see also 42
U.S.C. § 5121 (2000) (declaring the necessity of "expediting the rendering of aid, assis-
tance, and emergency services" to individuals and families in response to a major disaster).
71. Keith O'Brian & Bryan Bender, Chronology of Errors: How a Disaster Spread,
BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 11, 2005; MICHAEL ERIC DYSON, COME HELL OR HIGH WATER:
HURRICANE KATRINA AND THE COLOR OF DISASTER 63 (2006) (remarking on the lapse of
time between when Michael Brown was aware of the possibility for disaster and when he
sent troops).
72. MICHAEL ERIC DYSON, COME HELL OR HIGH WATER: HURRICANE KATRINA
AND THE COLOR OF DISASTER 65 (2006).
73. GOP Leaders Agree to Joint Katrina Hearings, CNN.coM, Sept. 8, 2005, http://
www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/09/07/katrina.congress/index.html.
74. U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE: FINAL REPORT OF
THE SELECT BIPARTISAN COMMI'TEE TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RE-
SPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA 20 (2006), http://www.gpoaccess.gov/katrinareport/main
report.pdf.
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According to academic and non-academic segments of society, race
played a role in FEMA's response to Hurricane Katrina. Many believe
the government would have responded in a more effective and efficient
manner if the people who were stranded were rich and White. 6 But "the
question shouldn't be whether race played a role, but what role it
played.",77 and whether or not this role violated the Constitution. Specif-
ically, did FEMA apply the Stafford Act "with an evil eye and an unequal
hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between
persons in similar circumstances?, 78 If not, were White and Black re-
sidents of New Orleans protected equally under the laws of the United
States? Viewed against the racial compositions and the socioeconomic
dispositions of the "survivors" of Katrina,79 the disproportionate distribu-
tion of resources to residents of New Orleans,"80 and its response to Hur-
ricanes Charley and Frances in Florida,8' the government may have
applied the Stafford Act "with an evil eye and unequal hand." For exam-
ple, FEMA may have blasted portions of the levees and troops may have
been deployed to protect the White areas of the city at the expense of the
Black areas.82 However, whether FEMA violated the constitution de-
75. MICHAEL ERIC DYSON, COME HELL OR HIGH WATER: HURRICANE KATRINA
AND THE COLOR OF DISASTER 18 (2006) ("It is safe to say that race played a major role in
the failure of the federal government.., to respond in a timely manner to the poor [B]lack
folk of Louisiana because [B]lack grief and pain have been ignored throughout the nation's
history.").
76. Jacob Weisberg, An Imperfect Storm, SLATE.COM, Sept. 7, 2005, http://www.slate.
com/?id=2125812 ("Had the residents of New Orleans been [W]hite Republicans in a state
that mattered politically, instead of poor [B]lacks in city that didn't, Bush's response surely
would have been different."); see Caren Bohan, Bush Says Katrina Rebuilding Could Take
Years, REUTERS, Aug. 28, 2006, available at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900
sid/KHII-6T53V8?OpenDocument.
77. MICHAEL ERIC DYSON, COME HELL OR HIGH WATER: HURRICANE KATRINA
AND THE COLOR OF DISASTER 18 (2006).
78. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374-75 (1886).
79. See infra Section IV.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See MICHAEL ERIC DYSON, COME HELL OR HIGH WATER: HURRICANE KATRINA
AND THE COLOR OF DISASTER 76, 196 (2006) (stating that levees were blasted during the
Great Flood of 1927 to achieve such a purpose); see also LAWYERS' COMM. FOR CIVIL
RIGHTS, TESTIMONY OF BARBARA R. ARNWINE, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, LAWYERS' COM-
MITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW 3 (2005), http://katrina.house.gov/hearings/
12 06 05/arnwine_120605.pdf (criticizing how National Guardsmen patrolled the areas of
the city where predominately White Americans lived to prevent looting of the abandoned
houses, while there was "virtually no visible law enforcement presence" at the areas where
Black residents evacuated, such as the Superdome and Convention Center). "[T]he pro-
tection of [W]hite-owned property became more important than the protection of Black
lives." Id.
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pends on whether the heads of FEMA applied the Stafford Act with the
intention to create a disparate impact; these officials could have acted
negligently without violating the Equal Protection Clause. The next sec-
tion begins to explore whether the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Clause is consistent with its purpose.
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
Before evaluating the federal government's response to Hurricane Ka-
trina under the Equal Protection Clause, this section discusses the evolu-
tion of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. While the Supreme
Court has distinguished between the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses,8 3 they both originated "from an ideal of fairness"84 and provide
seemingly indistinguishable protection. The Supreme Court has con-
strued the Due Process clause to "contain an equal protection compo-
nent,"8 6 and the equal protection analysis under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments is the same.87 Therefore, the Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment estab-
lishes the framework for analyzing alleged violations of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
The language of the Equal Protection Clause is ambiguous. The Clause
was designed "to foster equality in the face of stark social and economic
realities of inequality in America,"8 8 but it is susceptible to multiple inter-
pretations and may have failed to provide guidance to the Supreme
Court.89 Setting aside, for the moment, the subjectivity of interpretation,
83. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
erty without due process of law); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No state shall make or
enforce any law which shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws.").
84. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
85. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976) (discussing how the equal protection analy-
sis under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is the same).
86. Boiling, 347 U.S. at 497; see Buckley, 424 U.S. at 93.
87. Washington, 426 U.S. at 239; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 93 ("[The] Equal Protection
analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth
Amendment.").
88. Eric K. Yamamoto, Carly Minner, & Karen Winter, Contextual Strict Scrutiny, 49
How. L. J., 241, 287 (citing Kimberl6 W. Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment:
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331
(1988)).
89. Abe Fortas, The Amendment and Equality Under Law, in THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 100 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1970) ("[I]t is not true that the words of the
Fourteenth Amendment are clear and precise guides to conclusions and decisions.").
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the Supreme Court has distinguished between permissible and impermis-
sible forms of discrimination (or uses of race). Since this Note focuses on
the disparate impacts between Whites and Blacks in the context of Hurri-
cane Katrina, the following discussion on the evolution of the equal pro-
tection guarantee is limited to classifications based on race.
Race-based classifications, unlike other classifications, are "suspect"
and they trigger strict scrutiny. 9° When strict scrutiny is triggered, the
classification triggering strict scrutiny violates the Constitution unless the
classification serves a "compelling governmental interest" and is "nar-
rowly tailored" to advance the compelling interest.91 As the Court has
interpreted the Equal Protection Clause, there are three ways to trigger
strict scrutiny: (1) facial discrimination, (2) discrimination by design, and
(3) discriminatory application. 92 For purposes of this Note, "facial dis-
crimination" and "discrimination by design" are inapposite because the
legislation authorizing FEMA to respond to disasters (the Stafford Act)
is facially neutral, and evidence of a design to discriminate against an
identifiable group is lacking. Therefore, to establish a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause, a Hurricane Katrina survivor would have to
show FEMA applied legislation with the intent to produce a disparate
impact, or "discriminatory application."
"Men of equal integrity, of equal devotion to freedom and liberty and patriotism, have
arrived at fundamentally different interpretations of its words and principles." Id.
90. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). The court held that
"all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local government actor,
must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny. In other words, such classifica-
tions are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling
governmental interests." Id. The strict scrutiny standard originated in Korematsu in which
the court stated that race triggers "the most rigid scrutiny" because "all legal restrictions
which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect." Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
91. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 496, 508 (1980) (holding that the enactment of
a set-aside program was designed to serve a compelling governmental interest).
92. Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (stating that "the purpose
of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to secure every person
within the State's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether oc-
casioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through duly consti-
tuted agents"); Washington, 426 U.S. at 241 (stating that the discriminatory purpose need
not appear on the face of the statute, but that a facially neutral statute cannot be applied
"so as to invidiously to discriminate on the basis of race"); Personnel Adm'r of Mass., 442
U.S. at 279 (stating that "a racial classification ... is presumptively invalid" and that "this
rule applies as well to a classification that is ostensibly neutral but is an obvious pretext for
racial discrimination").
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A. Discriminatory Application
Laws, neutral on their face, are subject to the protections of the Equal
Protection Clause.9 3 In other words, the government cannot circumvent
the Equal Protection Clause by applying facially neutral laws in a discrim-
inatory manner. Unlike Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,94 the
Equal Protection Clause requires more than a showing of a disparate im-
pact. 95 In addition to showing a disparate impact, the plaintiff has to
show the government acted intentionally. 96 The Supreme Court estab-
lished this intent requirement in Washington v. Davis.97 In Davis, Justice
White stated that a statute "must not be applied so as invidiously to dis-
criminate on the basis of race" and that one could infer an invidious pur-
pose from the "totality of the relevant facts." 98 However, Justice White
also stated that disproportionate impact is "not the sole touchstone of an
invidious racial discrimination," and that, standing alone, it does not trig-
93. See Vill. of Willowbrook, 528 U.S. at 564 (stating that the Equal Protection Clause
protects against "intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by express
terms of a statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted agents.").
94. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000). The Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended the Civil Rights Act of
1964.
95. Washington, 426 U.S. at 239 ("[O]ur cases have not embraced the proposition that
a law or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory
purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact.").
96. Id; Personnel Adm'r of Mass., 442 U.S. at 279 (noting that a disproportionate im-
pact is not enough by itself). "[A] neutral law does not violate the Equal Protection Clause
solely because it results in a racially disproportionate impact; instead the disproportionate
impact must be traced to a purpose to discriminate on the basis of race." Id. at 260.
97. Washington, 426 U.S. at 239 ("A purpose to discriminate must be present which
may be proven by systematic exclusion of eligible jurymen of the proscribed race or by
unequal application of the law to such an extent as to show intentional discrimination.").
98. Id. at 242 (1976) (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)). The opinion by
Justice White and the concurring opinion by Justice Stevens both cite Yick Wo. Id. It is
hard to discuss violations of the Equal Protection Clause without discussing Yick Wo. Yick
Wo, 118 U.S. 356. Because the Supreme Court has developed the Clause since Yick Wo, it
was appropriate to relegate the point about the case to a footnote. Yick Wo was denied
equal protection of the laws because a facially neutral ordinance was applied in a discrimi-
natory manner. Id. The disparate impact (and the intent to create the disparate impact)
was obvious. Id. Two hundred Chinese permit applications were denied, while eighty non-
Chinese permit applications were "permitted to carry on the same business under similar
conditions." Id. Even though the government intended to benefit one group and burden
another, Yick Wo did not make such intent a pre-requisite to establishing a violation under
the Equal Protection Clause. See id. Washington and Feeney made this a pre-requisite. Id.
Given the evolution of the clause, a Katrina plaintiff would have to work a lot harder to
establish intent. This seems to suggest the Supreme Court has made it harder, over time,
to establish a violation under the Equal Protection Clause; see Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 356;
Personel Adm'r of Mass., 442 U.S. at 279.
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ger strict scrutiny.9 9 According to Justice Stevens's concurring opinion,
when the disparate impact is "dramatic," "it really does not matter
whether the standard is phrased in terms of purpose or effect."'10 0 To the
extent the Davis Court wrote a muddied opinion, it "clarified its posi-
tion"' 0 1 in Feeney by defining intent as choosing to apply a law "'because
of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable
group.,1 02 As discussed below, the intent requirement imposes a nearly
impossible burden on the plaintiff.
IV. THE GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE UNDER THE
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
According to Francis Boyle, a professor of law at the University of Illi-
nois, President Bush and his administration should be impeached for "de-
nying [e]qual [p]rotection of the [f]aws to the Katrina victims because
they are African-American and because they are [p]oor."' °3 Addition-
ally, he characterized the Bush administration's treatment of the Katrina
victims as "racist," "class-based," and "criminal., 10 4 FEMA's response to
Katrina is one avenue of attack; the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the Equal Protection Clause is another. As this paper seeks to demon-
strate, to successfully challenge FEMA's response, a survivor of Hurri-
cane Katrina would have to surpass seemingly insurmountable
constitutional hurdles (the intent requirement). In all likelihood, the in-
tent requirement of the Equal Protection Clause would preclude a survi-
vor of Hurricane Katrina from establishing a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.
99. Washington, 426 U.S. at 242.
100. Id. (Stevens J., concurring).
101. Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, but Now I See": White Race Consciousness and the
Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MIcH. L. REV. 953, 963 (1993).
102. Personnel Adm'r of Mass., 442 U.S. at 279 (describing how a course of action
must be, at least in part, "because of," not merely "in spite of," its adverse effects upon an
identifiable group).
103. Francis Boyle, Katrina, Bush, Cheney: Grounds for Impeachment, COUNTER-
PUNCH, Sept. 16, 2005 (arguing that both President George Bush and Vice President Che-
ney purposely denied the African-American victims of Hurricane Katrina equal protection
under the law simply because of their race). "Witness the racist and class-based criminal
mistreatment inflicted by the Bush administration upon the victims of Hurricane Katrina."
Id.
104. Id. (trying to persuade the reader that President Bush should be impeached for
the way his administration "criminally abandoned the Black and [p]oor Katrina victims in
their grisly and cruel fate").
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A. Disparate Impact
In Come Hell or High Water: Hurricane Katrina and the Color of Disas-
ter, Michael Eric Dyson draws an analogy between the poor Blacks in
New Orleans before Hurricane Katrina struck and the slaves in Pompeii
before Mount Vesuvius erupted. 10 5 Neither the poor Blacks in New Or-
leans nor the slaves in Pompeii were able to evacuate before the destruc-
tion of New Orleans and Pompeii, respectively. 10 6 Despite this similarity,
there is a major difference: federal, state, and local governments were
obligated to act. Under the Stafford Act, the federal government is sup-
posed to assist state and local governments "in carrying out their respon-
sibilities to alleviate the suffering and damage which result from" natural
disasters.107 However, FEMA failed to alleviate the suffering and dam-
age in New Orleans because it created an evacuation plan based on ac-
cess to automobiles. 10 8 To the extent the federal government failed to
assist the state and local governments in carrying out their responsibili-
ties,10 9 a disparate impact was created between Whites and Blacks in New
Orleans.
As discussed in Section I, there were pre-Katrina disparities between
Blacks and Whites in New Orleans. The city was divided along lines of
race and class, and there was a strong relationship between race and class
105. MICHAEL ERIC DYSON, COME HELL OR HIGH WATER: HURRICANE KATRINA
AND THE COLOR OF DISASTER, at ix-xii (2006).
106. Id.
107. 42 U.S.C. § 5121(b) (2000) (declaring "an orderly and continuing means of assis-
tance by the Federal Government to State and local governments" in response to major
disasters). In enacting this statute it is Congress's intent to provide the assistance of the
federal government to states affected by major disasters, such as Louisiana in response to
Hurricane Katrina. Id.
108. CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, AN UNNATURAL DISASTER: THE AFTERMATH
OF HURRICANE KATRINA 35 (2005), www.progressivereform.org/UnnaturalDisaster_512.
pdf (describing how the evacuation plan did not take into account how less privileged fami-
lies had no cars). "Of the households living in poverty, many have no access to a car." Id.
"This lack of access became crucial, given an evacuation plan premised on the ability of
people to get in their cars and drive out of New Orleans." Id.
109. See Keith O'Brian & Bryan Bender, Chronology of Errors: How a Disaster
Spread, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 11, 2005 ("[G]overnment officials at every level - local,
state, and federal - misjudged, miscommunicated, and underestimated both the power of
the storm and the seriousness of its aftermath. Their decisions, or in some cases failure to
decide anything at all, left tens of thousands imperiled."); see also Bush Admits Katrina
Response Was Inadequate, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Sept. 16, 2005, available at http://iht.com/
articles/2005/09/16/europe/web.0915katl.php (quoting President Bush as saying, "When
the federal government fails to meet such an obligation, I as [P]resident am responsible for
the problem . I..." Id.
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in New Orleans."' Sixty-seven percent of New Orleans was Black and
twenty-eight percent of the population lived below the poverty line.'11
The percentage of New Orleans citizens living below the poverty line was
approximately sixteen percentage points higher than the national aver-
age.112 Of the twenty-eight percent of its residents living below the pov-
erty line, eighty-four percent were Black. 13 In addition to being a poor
city, New Orleans was also a segregated city. In general, the poor Blacks
lived in the areas of the city below sea level, and the "well-to-do" Whites
lived in areas above sea level such as the French Quarter.1 4 Unlike the
French Quarter, the Ninth Ward, one of the most flood-prone areas of
the city, was ninety-eight percent Black." 5 As with housing, access to
cars was unequal for Blacks and Whites. 6 Out of the households in pov-
erty without a car, approximately 21,800 were Black, 2600 were White,
and 1400 were other.1 17 In other words, out of the households in poverty
without a car, eighty-five percent were Black. These pre-existing, pre-
Katrina statistics are significant because FEMA's evacuation plan was
based on access to automobiles.
110. See Jason DeParle, The Nation: Cast Away; Broken Levees, Unbroken Barriers,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2005 ("It was a cleavage of race and class, at once familiar and star-
tlingly new, laid bare in a setting where they suddenly amounted to matters of life and
death.").
111. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, FACT SHEET, NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA (2000), http://
factfinder.census.gov/home/saff/main.html?_Iang=en (search "New Orleans" for city and
select "Louisiana" from the dropdown list of states; then follow the "2000" hyperlink)
(listing demographic statistics for New Orleans, Louisiana based on the 2000 census).
112. Id. (reporting 12.4% of individuals in the United States below the poverty level
as of the year 2000).
113. Id. (search "New Orleans" for city and select "Louisiana" from the dropdown list
of states; then follow the "2000" hyperlink tab; then follow the "view a Fact Sheet for a
race, ethnic, or ancestry group" hyperlink; then select "Black alone"; and click "Go") (ac-
cording to the 2000 Census 110,215 of the 130,896 individuals below the poverty level in
New Orleans, Louisiana were Black or African-American).
114. See Jason DeParle, The Nation: Cast Away; Broken Levees, Unbroken Barriers,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2005 ("Hydrology joined sociology throughout the story line, from the
settling of the flooded city, where well-to-do [W]hite people lived on the high ground, to its
frantic abandonment.").
115. Greater New Orleans Community Data Center, http://www.gnocdc.org/orleans/8/
22/people.html (last visited Dec. 29, 2008).
116. See ALAN BERUBE & STEVEN RAPHAEL, BROOKINGS INST., ACCESS TO CARS IN
NEW ORLEANS 1 (2005), http://www.brookings.edu/metro/20050915_katrinacarstables.pdf
(discussing a specific disparity that separated New Orleans residents by race). The dispar-
ity between the number of African-Americans lacking access to automobiles in New Orle-
ans, compared to non-Hispanic Whites, became immediately apparent after Katrina. Id.
117. Jason DeParle, The Nation: Cast Away; Broken Levees, Unbroken Barriers, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 4, 2005. The figures were compiled based on 2000 Census data, and the article
noted that thirty-five percent of Black households didn't own a car compared to only fif-
teen percent of White households.
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FEMA's evacuation plan was incomplete. It was incomplete because it
failed to account for the households without access to cars. In this way, it
"led to preventable deaths, great suffering, and further delays in re-
lief."" 8 As demonstrated above, the households in poverty without a car
were predominately Black. Even though there was a relationship be-
tween poverty and cars (or lack thereof), there was also a relationship
between race and cars (or lack thereof). Even if all the households with-
out a car (in poverty and not in poverty) are considered, twenty-seven
percent were Black and five percent were White.119 Clearly, the evacua-
tion plan hindered evacuation and burdened Blacks because Blacks were
less likely than Whites to have cars. These disparities, coupled with
FEMA's evacuation plan, explain why a disproportionate number of the
residents stranded in New Orleans were Black. Since FEMA developed
the evacuation plan, it created the consequential disparate impact be-
tween Blacks and Whites.12 °
In addition to being stranded, these residents were burdened by the
government's delay in executing the incomplete plan. Michael Brown
sent FEMA employees to New Orleans after Katrina struck, and when
118. U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE: FINAL REPORT OF
THE SELECT BIPARTISAN COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RE-
SPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA 2 (2006), http://www.gpoaccess.gov/katrinareport/main
report.pdf.
119. ALAN BERUBE & STEVEN RAPHAEL, BROOKINGS INST., ACCESS TO CARS IN
NEW ORLEANS 1 (2005), http://www.brookings.edu/metro/20050915_katrinacarstables.pdf
("In the New Orleans metro area ... about five percent of non-Hispanic [W]hites lacked
auto access. By contrast, twenty-five percent of African-Americans in the New Orleans
area lacked access to a car ....").
120. See CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, AN UNNATURAL DISASTER: THE AFTER-
MATH OF HURRICANE KATRINA 36 (2005), www.progressivereform.org/UnnaturalDisas-
ter_512.pdf; see also Caren Bohan, Bush Says Katrina Rebuilding Could Take Years,
REUTERS, Aug. 28, 2006 (remarking how Blacks "bore the brunt of the suffering"); see also
Salim Muwakkil, Katrina's Racial Wake, IN THESE TIMES, Sept. 7, 2005, http://www.inthese
times.com/article/2314/katrina-racialwake ("African-Americans make up about sixty-
seven percent of the population of New Orleans, but clearly they were disproportionately
victimized by the hurricane and its aftermath."); see also Noah Leavitt, The U.S. Govern-
ment's Flawed Response to Hurricane Katrina: Why It Should Be Viewed as a Human
Rights Failure, and What the Consequences of That Could Be, FINDLAw, Mar. 7, 2006, http:/
/writ.news.findlaw.com/leavitt/20060307.html ("Of course, FEMA's orders were not ra-
cially discriminatory on their face, but they had a dramatically disparate impact because of
the high poverty rate of African-Americans compared to other groups in and around New
Orleans."). According to Ann Fagan Ginger, even though the "FEMA orders" were
facially neutral, "everyone familiar with the facts knew they would have a disparate impact
on people of color because the poverty rate in Black communities is much higher than in
[W]hite communities." Id.; see also Benjamin Dangl, Human Rights Violations in the After-
math of Hurricane Katrina, TOWARD FREEDOM, Dec. 6, 2005, http://www.towardfreedom.
com/home/content/view/691.
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they arrived, they directed the stranded residents to unsafe and unsani-
tary shelters, namely the Superdome and New Orleans Convention
Center. Had the government developed an all-encompassing plan and
responded to Hurricane Katrina in a timely manner, the stranded re-
sidents could have avoided the effects of the flood and the conditions at
the Superdome and the New Orleans Convention Center. FEMA could
have lessened the disparate impact between Whites and Blacks, the ef-
fects of which are still lingering. Studies such as the one conducted by the
Kaiser Family Foundation have identified a number of lingering effects.
According to the study, the percentage of Blacks who "described their
lives as disrupted" was double the percentage for Whites.12 1 Whites
surely suffered from Katrina's wrath, but "[Bilacks were disproportion-
ately living in the areas that were most flooded., 122 Unfortunately, un-
like Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Equal Protection Clause
requires more than a showing of a disparate impact.123
B. The Intent Requirement
In addition to satisfying the disparate impact requirement, a petitioner
challenging the government's response would have to satisfy the intent
requirement of the Equal Protection Clause.' 24 While a majority of
Blacks believe the government's response was related to race, 125 the peti-
tioner would have to show the government intended to create a disparate
impact. After scrutinizing the disproportionate distribution of resources
between Blacks and Whites, contrasting the federal government's re-
sponse to Hurricane Katrina with Hurricanes Charley and Frances in
Florida, and taking into account the government's knowledge about the
121. Peter Whoriskey, Katrina Hit Blacks Harder than Whites, Study Finds, WASH.
POST, May 10, 2007, at A02 (highlighting the findings of a survey conducted by the Kaiser
Family Foundation).
122. Id. (quoting Mollyann Brodie, vice president of public opinion and media re-
search for the Kaiser Family Foundation).
123. Washington, 426 U.S. at 239 (describing how a discriminatory purpose is also
necessary).
124. Id. at 241 (explaining how a particular act can, however, create a prima facie
showing of intent). "With a prima facie case made out, 'the burden of proof shifts to the
State to rebut the presumption of unconstitutional action by showing that permissible ra-
cially neutral selection criteria and procedures have produced the monochromatic result."'
Id. (citation omitted).
125. Sheryll Cashin, Katrina: The American Dilemma Redux, in AFrER THE STORM:
BLACK INTELLECTUALS EXPLORE THE MEANING OF HURRICANE KATRINA 30 (David
Dante Troutt ed. 2006) ("Most [Bilack people ... felt in their bones that this delay would
not have happened if the majority of people stranded at the Superdome and New Orleans
Convention Center had been [W]hite.").
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vulnerable groups in New Orleans, a fact-finder could infer the govern-
ment acted intentionally.
The distribution of resources benefited Whites more than Blacks. First,
the National Guard protected White areas of the city at the expense of
the areas to which many Blacks evacuated such as Superdome and New
Orleans Convention Center. 26 A curfew was imposed on the French
Quarter and the National Guard policed the wealthy areas, such as the
Superdome and Convention Center.127 The Superdome and Convention
Center were supposed to be safe havens, but conditions there escalated to
the point where bus drivers, fearing violence, refused to drive there. 28
The protection of White property was seemingly more important than the
protection of Black lives.129 Second, as Louis Farrakhan has sug-
gested, 30 portions of the levees may have been blasted to save the rich,
mostly White areas of the city at the expense of the poor, mostly Black
areas of the city. There is evidence of a "levee bomb," the explosion of
which flooded the Ninth Ward.'31 Before a House Committee, witnesses
126. See LAWYERS' COMM. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, TESTIMONY OF BARBARA R.
ARNWINE, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, LAWYERS' COMMITEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW
3 (2005), http://katrina.house.gov/hearings/12 06-05/arnwine-120605.pdf; see also MICHAEL
ERIC DYSON, COME HELL OR HIGH WATER: HURRICANE KATRINA AND THE COLOR OF
DISASTER, at v (2006). A survivor who was stranded at the Convention Center was quoted
as follows:
We were in the Convention Center for five days without food, without water, without
help. Only way we got food is we had to go in restaurants and stores where people
had looted and vandalized to feed ourselves and give ourselves water .... We had
nowhere to sleep, we had no security, we had no light. We had to survive in the streets
.... I think that was the worst nightmare I ever had. Id.
127. LAWYERS' COMM. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, TESTIMONY OF BARBARA R. ARNWINE,
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, LAWYERS' COMM1TIEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW 3 (2005),
http://katrina.house.gov/hearings/12-06-05/amwine 120605.pdf (discussing race and class
inequities in the New Orleans area).
128. Id.
129. Id. (explaining how Hurricane Katrina exposed race inequities within New
Orleans).
130. U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE: FINAL REPORT OF
THE SELECT BIPARTISAN COMMITrEE TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RE-
SPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA 19 (2006), http://www.gpoaccess.gov/katrinareport/
mainreport.pdf ("Louis Farrakhan suggested New Orleans' levees were intentionally
blown up to destroy primarily African-American neighborhoods.").
131. Lisa Myers & the NBC Investigative Unit, Were the Levees Bombed in New Orle-
ans? Ninth Ward Residents Give Voice to a Conspiracy Theory, MSNBC.COM, Dec. 7,
2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10370145/ (referencing the testimony of a New Orle-
ans resident, Dyan French, before the House Select Committee on Hurricane Katrina).
She testified that she "has witnesses that they bombed the levee walls." Id. Furthermore,
other New Orleans residents believe the levee bombing theory to be factual and an "act of
genocide" and "ethnic cleansing." Id. Harvard professor Alvin Pouissant believes that
"such conspiracy theories are fueled by years of government neglect and discrimination
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testified to "explosion sounds" and a "30 foot crater at the bottom of the
Seventeenth Street levee.' 132 Whether the levee bomb is real or not, pro-
tecting one group (or one group's property) over another is evidence of
intent. Coupled with the federal government's response to Hurricane
Charley and Frances and the government's knowledge of the vulnerable
groups in New Orleans, the evidence becomes more compelling.
The federal government's response to Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana
was "starkly different" from its response to Hurricanes Charley and Fran-
ces in Florida.133 The difference lies in FEMA's response times to the
hurricanes. Even though Charley and Frances were less intense than Ka-
trina,134 the government responded to these low intensity hurricanes in
an adequate and timely manner. The Wall Street Journal characterized
FEMA's response to Charley and Frances as a "tour-de-force.' '135
Whereas Michael Brown ignored the warnings for Hurricane Katrina,
supplies were "pre-positioned" and ready-to-go before Hurricanes Char-
ley and Frances struck. 1 36 Indeed, much of the hardship suffered by the
survivors of Katrina stemmed from FEMA's incomplete evacuation of
New Orleans. Despite plenty of advance notice, FEMA was not pre-
against [B]lacks." Id. These levee bombing theories are "partly rooted in historical fact."
Id. "In 1927, the levees were bombed to save parts of the city, and [B]lack neighborhoods
were inundated." Id. A team from the University of Berkeley headed by Professor Rob-
ert Bea studied the levee failures and found no evidence indicating explosions. Id.
132. Challenges Facing African-American Evacuees from Hurricane Katrina (C-SPAN
television broadcast Dec. 6, 2005), available at http://www.c-span.org (search "Challenges
Facing African-American Evacuees from Hurricane Katrina").
133. John Dinan & Dale Krane, The State of American Federalism, 2005: Federalism
Resurfaces in the Political Debate, 36 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 327, 329 (2006) (citing the
Wall Street Journal); see Eva Paterson, Katrina Victims Cast to Streets in Coldest Months,
Holidays, PROGRESSIVE, Nov. 29, 2005, available at http://www.progressive.org/media-mp
peterson112905 (describing FEMA's responses to Katrina and Charley as "very different"
and painting two very different pictures of FEMA's responses).
134. See generally Press Release, Office of Press Sec., Responding to Hurricanes
Charley and Frances (Sept. 14, 2004), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/re-
leases/2004/09/20040914-14.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2008) (noting Hurricane Charley was
a category IV and Hurricane Frances was a category II).
135. Ann Carrns, Chad Terhune, Kris Hudson, & Gary Fields, Overwhelmed: As U.S.
Mobilizes Aid, Katrina Exposes Flaws in Preparation-Despite Warnings, Officials Say
There Wasn't Clear Plan For a New Orleans Disaster-Bush: Recovery to 'Take Years,'
WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 2005, at Al (describing how, in hurricanes Charley and Frances, the
government was able to quickly and effectively get aid to victims).
136. Eva Paterson, Katrina Victims Cast to Streets in Coldest Months, Holidays, PRO-
GRESSIVE, Nov. 29, 2005, available at http://www.progressive.org/mediamppeterson112905
("Days before Charley reached Florida's shores, truckloads of water and supplies were
pre-positioned for rapid deployment. Two days after that hurricane, President Bush and
his brother, Gov. Jeb Bush, were on the ground, handing out ice to the primarily [W]hite
survivors.").
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pared for Katrina, and such lack of preparedness led to preventable
deaths and losses.'
37
Notwithstanding the differences, there is one significant similarity be-
tween FEMA's responses to these hurricanes. FEMA appears to have
mismanaged resources in Florida and Louisiana. Strangely, FEMA paid
for approximately two hundred funerals in Florida even though Hurri-
canes Charley and Frances caused no deaths.'38 Under the Stafford Act,
FEMA cannot pay for funerals unless the death is directly related to the
disaster.139 By paying the funeral expenses for deaths unrelated to Hurri-
canes Charley and Frances, FEMA officials violated the Stafford Act.14 °
Even though a grand jury indicted some FEMA employees for fraud, 4 '
the threat of a criminal conviction did not deter them from mismanaging
FEMA resources. If nothing else, this underscores the Stafford Act's po-
tential for abuse. The evidence underlying a mismanagement of re-
sources in New Orleans is no less compelling. 142
Based on statistical information widely available, the federal govern-
ment knew or should have known that a substantial percentage of the
137. U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE: FINAL REPORT OF
THE SELECT BIPARTISAN COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RE-
SPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA 2 (2006), http://www.gpoaccess.gov/katrinareport/main
report.pdf.
138. Sally Kestin, Megan O'Matz & Jon Burstein, FEMA Paid for at Least 203 Funer-
als Not Related to 2004 Hurricanes, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Aug. 10, 2005, available at http:/
/www.sun-sentinel.comlnews/local/southflorida/sfl-femal0augl0,0,1862957.story ("The fed-
eral government used hurricane aid money to pay funeral expenses for at least 203 Floridi-
ans whose deaths were not caused by last year's storms .... ).
139. See 42 U.S.C. § 5174(e)(1) (2000) (making financial assistance dependent on
those affected by a disaster). "The President, in consultation with the Governor of a State,
may provide financial assistance under this section to an individual or household in the
State who is adversely affected by a major disaster to meet disaster-related medical, dental,
and funeral expenses." Id.
140. See Sally Kestin, Megan O'Matz & Jon Burstein, FEMA Paid for at Least 203
Funerals Not Related to 2004 Hurricanes, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Aug. 10, 2005, available at
http://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/local/southflorida/sfl-femal0auglO,0,1862957.story; see
also Megan O'Matz, Court to FEMA: Turn Over Documents, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, June
23, 2007 available at http://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/local/southflorida/sfl-74femadocu-
ments,02517325.story ("FEMA paid millions of dollars to people who had little or no dam-
age from Hurricane Frances and some of the other storms that hit in 2004.").
141. Sun-Sentinel.com, Sun-Sentinel Investigation: FEMA, http://www.sun-sentinel.
com/news/sfl-femacoverage,0,6697347.storygallery?coll=sfl-bonus-news (last visited Dec.
22, 2008) (reporting that the grand jury has indicted more than a dozen FEMA employees
on fraud charges).
142. GOP Leaders Agree to Joint Katrina Hearings, CNN.coM, Sept. 8, 2008, http://
www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/O9/O7/katrina.congress/index.html (referencing Nancy
Pelosi, who believes that if FEMA is going to succeed, it needs to focus on management
and accountability).
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Black population in New Orleans was living below the poverty level.' 14 3
It knew or should have known that a substantial percentage of the Black
population in New Orleans also lacked access to automobiles."' FEMA
knew or should have known its plan would impact Blacks and Whites
disproportionately. Even though FEMA's plan should have reflected
these demographical and socioeconomic statistics, it devised a plan based
on access to automobiles and failed to use forms of public transportation
to evacuate the residents without access to automobiles. Additionally, it
knew or should have known Katrina was approaching and the levees
were structurally unsound, but it delayed the evacuation process.14 5 Sim-
ply put, FEMA knew, or should have known, Blacks would suffer more
than Whites under its evacuation plan, but it proceeded to implement the
plan anyway. It seems as if FEMA acted negligently, but negligence is
insufficient to establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
Assuming a survivor of Hurricane Katrina could show the government
acted intentionally, it would have to show the government acted "because
of" not "in spite of" the disparate impact.1 4 6 FEMA could have known
its application of the law would create a disparate impact. However, un-
less FEMA intended to create the disparate impact, it did not violate the
Constitution. As the discussion on the intent requirement demonstrates,
143. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, FACT SHEET, NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA (2000), http://
factfinder.census.gov/home/saff/main.html?-lang=en (search "New Orleans" for city and
select "Louisiana" from the dropdown list of states; then follow the "2000" hyperlink tab;
then follow the "view a Fact Sheet for a race, ethnic, or ancestry group" hyperlink; then
select "Black alone"; and click "Go") (alluding to the statistic that eighty-four percent of
the individuals living below the poverty level in New Orleans, Louisiana are African-
American or Black).
144. LAWYERS' COMM. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, TESTIMONY OF BARBARA R. ARNWINE,
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, LAWYERS' COMMIITEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW 3 (2005),
http://katrina.house.gov/hearings/12-06 05/arnwine-120605.pdf ("Census data available on
the FEMA website prior to Katrina showed approximately 40,000 residents without auto-
mobiles and without access to private transportation lived in predominantly African-
American sections of the City."). "Before Katrina hit, it was clear to FEMA and to any-
one who inquired that the people in New Orleans who could not evacuate on their own
would be Black." Id.
145. See supra Section II.
146. Personnel Adm'r of Mass., 442 U.S. at 279.
"Discriminatory purpose," however, implies more than intent as volition or intent as
awareness of consequences. It implies that the decision maker, in this case a state
legislature, selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part "be-
cause of," not merely "in spite of," its adverse effects upon an identifiable group (foot-
note omitted).
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the U.S. Supreme Court has imposed a nearly impossible burden on the
plaintiff.
147
V. A CRITIQUE OF THE INTENT REQUIREMENT
The intent requirement established in Washington v. Davis,148 and re-
fined in Feeney,149 fails to account for unconscious discrimination. 5 ° As
the Supreme Court has interpreted the Equal Protection Clause, an in-
tention to discriminate on the basis of race is a prerequisite to establish-
ing a constitutional violation.151  Opponents have attacked this
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause because it places a near
impossible burden on the plaintiff and "racial inequality exists irrespec-
tive of the decision makers' motives."' 52 Under the intent requirement,
plaintiffs are essentially required to establish the mental state of the gov-
ernmental actor who allegedly violated the Equal Protection Clause.
Furthermore, the governmental actor must have applied (or written) the
race-neutral legislation "because of, not in spite of" its discriminatory ef-
fect.1 53 To be sure, this narrower definition of intent makes it harder to
establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
147. Kenneth L. Karst, The Costs of Motive-Centered Inquiry, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
1163, 1165 (1978) ("A motive-centered theory forces the litigants in a race case into name-
calling on one side and self-righteousness on the other.").
148. Washington, 426 U.S. at 245 (concluding that proof of "discriminatory racial pur-
pose" is necessary to establish an equal protection violation).
149. Personnel Adm'r of Mass., 442 U.S. at 279 (noting that an adverse impact alone is
not sufficient).
150. Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Disparity Rules, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 374, 388 (2007)
(describing how legislatures have "little incentive" to consider how policies help perpetu-
ate racial inequality).
151. Washington, 426 U.S. at 239 (distinguishing between the intent requirement of
the Equal Protection Clause and the disparate impact requirement of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act requires a showing of "a seemingly
neutral practice or policy that has a significantly adverse impact on persons of a protected
class." Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1486 (9th Cir. 1993). After the plaintiff
shows this disparate impact, the burden shifts to the employer to "demonstrate that the
challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with business
necessity." Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(2000)). Opponents of the intent re-
quirement have proposed adopting this standard in place of the intent requirement.
152. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 319 (1987). The burden is seemingly impossi-
ble because the plaintiff must prove state of mind, which is "easy to hide." Id.; see Barbara
J. Flagg, "Was Blind, but Now I See": White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of
Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 967 (1993) ("[T]he discriminatory intent re-
quirement had borne steady and intense academic criticism.").
153. Personnel Adm'r of Mass., 442 U.S. at 279 (showing how an act that is merely
known to cause a disproportionate impact is still valid if there was a legitimate, not dis-
criminate, purpose behind the legislation).
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Because the intent requirement fails to account for unconscious dis-
crimination, it is a "poor tool" for addressing racial disparities.' 54 It is a
"[W]hite way of thinking about racial harm," '155 and it suggests that it is
more blameworthy to use race consciously (as opposed to unconsciously)
as a factor in decision-making.' 56 When the Supreme Court established
the intent requirement, it seemed to have underestimated the potential
extent of "unconscious racism.' 157 According to author Charles Law-
rence, our history has influenced our thought processes and to this extent
"we are all racists" and that "most of us are unaware of our racism.' 158 It
is unclear why the Supreme Court has interpreted the Equal Protection
Clause to protect against intentional racism and not unintentional racism.
In short, the Equal Protection Clause fails to provide "equal protection of
the laws" when the government, perhaps influenced by unconscious ra-
cism, applies a law so as to create a disparate impact. Since the Equal
Protection Clause should protect against conscious and unconscious ra-
cism, it is time for the Supreme Court to re-evaluate its interpretation of
the Clause and consider some alternatives to the intent requirement.
The commentators who have criticized the Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause have offered solutions to the short-
comings of the intent requirement. 159 These solutions would reduce the
154. Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Disparity Rules, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 374, 375 (2007)
(discussing how the mechanisms which may cause disparities may not be intentional).
"While a social scientist might undertake an analysis to further uncover and understand the
mechanisms that produce these disparities, law has traditionally provided poor tools for
understanding these mechanisms and prompting public intervention to address racial dis-
parities." Id.
155. Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, but Now I See": White Race Consciousness and the
Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 968 (1993) (providing an ex-
planation for the stability of the discriminatory intent requirement despite ample criti-
cism). "[W]hite people tend to view intent as an essential element of racial harm; non-
[W]hites do not." Id. "[T]he Davis rule presupposes the existence of race-neutral decision
making. White's level of confidence in race neutrality is much greater than non-[W]hites'
.
Id.
156. See id. at 980 (describing one of two assumptions that the intent requirement
might rest upon to provide justification for approving unconsciously race-specific decision
making).
157. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322 (1987) ("[A] large part of the behav-
ior that produces racial discrimination is influenced by unconscious racial motivation.").
158. Id. (commenting that racism plays a dominant role in America's historical and
cultural heritage). "[Americans] do not recognize the ways in which our cultural experi-
ence has influenced our beliefs about race or the occasions on which those beliefs affect
our actions." Id.
159. Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, but Now I See": White Race Consciousness and the
Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 967 n.66 (1993) (citing numer-
ous critics of the discriminatory intent requirement). Some of these critics offer solutions
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harms of racial inequality and the burden on plaintiffs challenging the
conduct of the government under the Equal Protection Clause. One so-
lution is to replace the intent requirement with the disparate impact stan-
dard of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.1 6 ° To establish a violation under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, an employment practice must have
caused "a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin." '161 Unlike plaintiffs suing under the Equal Protection
Clause, plaintiffs suing under Title VII do not have to satisfy an intent
requirement. Presumably, this reduced burden provides a disincentive to
discriminate in the employment context. While the disparate impact
standard is suitable in the employment context, it is not suitable in the
Equal Protection context. If the Supreme Court limited its analysis under
the Equal Protection Clause to a disparate impact, the constitutionality of
social service programs would be called into question and the floodgates
would be opened. 62 However, there is a more practical solution to the
intent requirement.
Another way to reduce the burden of the intent requirement is to re-
place it with a negligence standard. Like the intent requirement and un-
like the disparate impact standard, this standard requires some degree of
culpability, albeit a lesser degree than intent. It punishes a governmental
actor when he or she knew or should have known the application of a law
would create a disparate impact. As demonstrated above, FEMA knew
or should have known its response would create a disparate impact.
Therefore, a plaintiff challenging its response could have prevailed under
some type of negligence standard.
VI. CONCLUSION
Under current equal protection jurisprudence, FEMA can prepare for
and respond to a disaster without taking racial and socioeconomic condi-
tions into account. As the discussion above demonstrates, FEMA can
to the intent requirement, such as broadening the conception of intent, holding the govern-
ment more accountable for its actions that have foreseeable discriminatory effects, and
using a heightened standard of scrutiny to review cases that result in a disproportionate
impact. Id.
160. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000) (lacking language requiring intent). "A
plaintiff in a Title VII action can proceed under three different theories, disparate treat-
ment discrimination, pattern and practice discrimination or disparate impact discrimina-
tion. The first two theories require a showing of discriminatory intent, while the third does
not." Knopfel v. Tech Data Corp., 225 F.R.D. 263,265 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (citation omitted).
161. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000) (describing the "disparate impact" standard).
162. Washington, 426 U.S. at 248 (acknowledging the far-reaching effects of a rule that
would invalidate a statute simply because it happens to burden one race more than
another).
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negligently create a disparate impact. Whether FEMA acted intention-
ally or negligently when it responded to Hurricane Katrina, it discrimi-
nated against Blacks.
"Racial discrimination in any form and in any degree has no justifiable
part whatever in our democratic way of life."' 63 The Equal Protection
Clause was enacted to protect people against discrimination. Curiously,
the Supreme Court has limited this protection to intentional discrimina-
tion notwithstanding our ability to discriminate without an intention to
discriminate.' 6 4 Since the subconscious influences decision-making, the
Supreme Court's limitation fails to provide equal protection of the laws.
Even though FEMA's response impacted Blacks and Whites dispropor-
tionately and even though FEMA may have acted negligently, the intent
requirement would preclude a survivor of Katrina from establishing a vi-
olation of Equal Protection Clause. This is inconsistent with the purposes
of the Equal Protection Clause and Equal Protection Clause precedent is
a "poor tool" for addressing racial discrimination.' 6 5 As with the "sepa-
rate but equal" doctrine, 166 the Supreme Court should re-evaluate its in-
terpretation of the Clause and provide the tools necessary to ensure equal
protection of the laws.
163. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 242 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
164. Sara Benson, Reviving the Disparate Impact Doctrine to Combat Unconscious
Discrimination: A Study of Chin v. Runnels, 31 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 43, 43 (2005) ("In
the years since Washington v. Davis, legal scholars have criticized the intent doctrine for
failing to address the underlying problems of racial and unconscious discrimination.").
165. Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Disparity Rules, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 374, 375 (2007)
(describing how discrimination may be completely unconscious). Toxic and polluting facili-
ties are more often sited in minority communities, even when controlling for income levels.
African-American youths receive longer, harsher sentences than [W]hite youths who com-
mit similar crimes and with similar criminal histories. These examples of contemporary
racial disparities illustrate the puzzle of modern day racial inequity: Disparities in a wide
variety of social indicators exist, yet the causal mechanisms that produce these disparities
are not immediately apparent. Id. (footnotes omitted).
166. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (overturning the "separate but equal"
doctrine).
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